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NOTES
Competency To Stand Trial - Pre-Trial Procedures
Mental unsoundness raises two distinct problems in criminal law: (1)
non-responsibility for the alleged offense by reason of insanity, and (2)
competency to stand trial. "Insanity" is related to the accused's mental
status at the time of the crime; on the other hand, "incompetency" relates
to his mental status at the time of trial. Although the rule against trying
an incompetent person is well established, the procedure for its implemen-
tation is not. The revised Texas Code of Criminal Procedure includes a
new attempt to remedy previous procedural difficulties. However, the
shortcomings of the new statute are illustrated by the first case' arising
under its provisions. This Note will attempt to depict these inadequacies,
as well as analyze possible statutory modifications available to future re-
visors of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING ON COMPETENCY
To STAND TRIAL
The competency rule was rooted in the common law as a by-product of
the ban against trials in absentia-the mentally incompetent defendant,
though physically present in the courtroom, was in reality afforded no op-
portunity to defend himself. Accordingly, when a defendant was found
to be incompetent,' trial on the merits,' punishment,' or execution was
barred until such time as he had regained mental competency. Although
the early cases considered it inhuman7 and unconstitutional' to bring the
incompetent defendant to trial, the procedure for dealing with incompet-
ency pleas was uncertain. When the question of competency was raised
before the trial, the trial court, in the absence of statutes, had wide dis-
cretion in calling and conducting a competency examination.' Engaging
'Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
'For a history of the rule, see, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899).
Under this rule it was irrelevant that the accused might have been sane at the time of commission
of the offense. Commonwealth v. Endrukat, 231 Pa. 529, 80 A. 1049 (1911).
'The generally accepted test of incompetency was: Has the defendant capacity to understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own condition in reference
to such proceedings, and to make a rational defense? Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (1874). See
H1 WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 335 (1933).
4 Moss v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 860 (1948);
Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (1874). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R. 94 (1918).
aDuncan v. State, 110 Ark. 523, 162 S.W. 573 (1913); State v. Helm, 69 Ark. 167, 61 S.W.
915 (1901); People v. Lawson, 178 Cal. 722, 174 P. 885 (1918); People v. Wolfe, 198 Misc. 695,
103 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Kings County Ct. 1950).
'Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927); People v. Geary, 298 I1. 236, 131 N.E. 652
(1921); State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927).
'Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); People v. Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, 94 P.2d 559 (1939),
Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1123 (1939); People v. Jackson, 105 Cal. App. 2d 811, 234 P.2d 261 (1951);
Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1911).
'United States ex rel. Mazy v. Ragen, 149 F.2d 948 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 791
(1945); United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906); Youtsey v. United States, 97
F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961); United States v.
Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
'H. WEHoFEN, supra note 3, at 346.
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a jury for the competency determination was within the trial judge's dis-
cretion, for he was free to use any method which was discreet and con-
venient."° The pre-trial determination of the judge generally was sustained
unless it was clearly arbitrary."1
Statutes now have codified rules concerning the determination of com-
petency in all states.' In addition, the United States Supreme Court re-
cently declared in Pate v. Robinson"' that trial and conviction of an in-
competent defendant constitutes a denial of due process and that state
procedures must be adequate to protect this right. Although the Pate
Court held that the defendant is entitled to a "special hearing" to de-
termine his competency to stand trial, it did not formulate specific due
process requirements."
II. TExAs DEVELOPMENTS
Pre-1966 Development. The various pre-1966 Texas cases and legislative
enactments reflect considerable confusion between the concepts of com-
petency to stand trial and insanity." Both statutes and cases referred to
incompetency and insanity' as though the only distinguishing feature was
the time element."
In Guagando v. State" the Texas Supreme Court permitted the defend-
ant to litigate the issue of incompetency prior to the trial on the criminal
charge. Because there were no existing statutes on this procedure, the
Guagando holding was later described by a Texas court as a "judicial in-
vention of a procedural device for assertion of the right not to be tried
while insane . .. ."' Subsequent cases held that the submission of the
issue of competency along with the issue of guilt to the same jury at the
end of the trial on the merits constituted reversible error. * In Ramirez v.
State" the court recognized the necessity of bifurcation to determine the
"Hess, Pearsall, Slichter, Thomas, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competncy To Stand Trial,
59 MIcii. L. REV. 1078, 1079 (1961).
"People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal. 2d 565, 241 P.2d 221 (1952); People v. Rosner, 78 Cal. App.
497, 248 P. 683 (1926).
"2See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 104-2 (1963), which the United States Supreme Court
examined in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
"383 U.S. 375 (1966).
s' If the hearing must take place before a jury, must it be a jury other than the convicting jury?
In an analogous situation, the United States Supreme Court determined that due process would be
satisfied only with a bifurcated trial. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The Court disap-
proved of the same jury determining the voluntariness of a confession and then determining its
probative value in establishing guilt or innocence. The Court emphasized the necessity for two
separate juries to determine the two issues.
"Ex parte Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958); Freeman v. State, 166 Tex.
Crim. 636, 317 S.W.2d 726 (1958), where the court held, in effect, that there was no significant
distinction to be drawn between incompetency to stand trial and insanity as a defense to an alleged
crime.
"Insanity is a defense under a plea of not guilty and is properly presented at the trial on the
merits. King v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. R. $15, $44 (1880).
sTex. Laws 1937, ch. 466, art. 932a, at 1172; Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 486, art. 932b, at 143.
"841 Tex. 626 (1874).
"State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.), rehearing denied, 163 Tex. 449, 360 S.W.2d 402
(1962). See also Woodley, Insanity as a Bar to Criminal Prosecution, 3 So. TEx. L.J. 204 (1958).
"Soderman v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 23, 260 S.W. 607 (1924); Ramirez v. State, 92 Tex. Crim.
38, 241 S.W. 1020 (1922).
" 92 Tex. Crim. 38, 241 S.W. 1020 (1922).
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issue of incompetency and the issue of insanity, noting that much con-
fusion would arise if both issues were submitted at the same trial. The
court also observed that the defendant likely would be prejudiced if he
attempted to present incompetency issues to the same jury which heard the
inflammatory details of the corpus delicti."
The first Texas statute delineating the procedure for determining in-
competency, article 932a, was enacted in 1937.'3 The statute not only was
ineffective in describing the circumstances under which a preliminary hear-
ing was available;' it also was imprecise in separating incompetency and
insanity." Article 932a provided for the submission of the issues of in-
competency and insanity at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on
the merits.
In 1957 article 932a was repealed by article 932b" which, unfortunate-
ly, was a procedural regression. Article 932b also permitted the issue of
insanity to be submitted as a "second issue"' 7 at the preliminary com-
petency hearing. The difference between article 932a and article 932b
was the effect of the submission of the issue of insanity at the preliminary
hearing. Under article 932b, a finding of insanity at the preliminary hear-
ing resulted in acquittal, the same as if the insanity finding were made by
the jury at the trial on the merits." Thus, under article 932b it was pos-
sible for an accused to be found not guilty of an alleged offense even
though the indictment was not read, the plea was not entered, and the trial
on the merits for the criminal charge never held." As a result, the courts
were jammed with requests for preliminary hearings," thereby undermin-
ing the purpose of the preliminary competency hearing. The unavoidable
delays of the trial on the merits and dissatisfaction with multiple trials
and multiple juries led to the recent change in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure!'
Interpreting the New Code Provisions-The Townsend Decision. Article
46.02 of the new Code does not merely amend or revise the provisions of
article 932b. It attempts to establish new and better rules for dealing with
the issue of mental unsoundness." To avoid a multiplicity of juries, com-
" "If he be now insane, the fair decision of the issue should not be clouded and prejudiced by
the introduction of the facts involving a bloodcurdling murder-facts which alone might so stir
the minds of the jury as to make difficult the exercise of calm judgment upon the question of
present insanity." Id. at 38, 241 S.W. at 1021.
"3Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 466, art. 932a, at 1172.
"State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.), rehearing denied, 163 Tex. 449, 360 S.W.2d 402
(1962).
25 Morgan v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 76, 117 S.W.2d 76 (1938).
"Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 486, art. 932b, at 143.
" Insanity could not be the sole issue at the preliminary hearing.
2" See Woodley, supra note 19.
29In re Hillyer0 372 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
" See Woodley, supra note 19.
"I id.
"However, TEX. CoDE Cnme. Paoc. ANN. art. 46.02, S 1 (1965) does not clarify the distinc-




petency can be tried in advance of trial on the merits only with consent
of the state's attorney and approval of the judge.as Thus, if the accused
requests an advance determination of competency and presents a reason-
able basis for such request," the prosecutor can nevertheless withhold his
consent and compel the defendant to litigate incompetency along with
the merits of the case.
Townsend v. States is the first case interpreting the incompetency issue
under the provisions of the new Code. In Townsend the trial judge ap-
pointed a psychiatrist who examined the defendant and reported him in-
competent. The defendant's attorney then moved for a preliminary hear-
ing solely on the issue of competency to stand trial. The prosecutor re-
fused to consent to such proceeding and relied on the wording of section
1 of article 46.02" to prevent the trial judge from granting the motion.
On appeal, the court of criminal appeals was faced with the problem of
reconciling the conflicting provisions of section 1 of article 46.02, article
34 of the Penal Code (which prohibits the trial of one who is "insane"),"
and the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Pate v. Robin-
son." The court of criminal appeals held that where the prosecutor's con-
sent and approval to a preliminary hearing are not given, the trial judge
is under the duty, after selection of the jury for trial on the merits and
preferably before reading of the indictment," to give the accused a hear-
ing before the jury on the sole issue of his competency to stand trial. In
this way, the court reasoned, the jury can determine competency unclut-
tered by evidence of the offense itself. Further, the court felt that this
holding afforded the defendant a procedure for the preservation of his
rights under article 34 of the Penal Code as well as satisfying the due
process requirements of Pate.
In view of the statutory conflicts, the Townsend decision was a remark-
able attempt to produce sound, working procedural rules for trying the
issue of competency. However, Townsend, in addition to specifically de-
clining to answer numerous procedural questions,' implicitly raises se-
asTex. CODE CRuI. Poc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 1 (1965).
" E.g., a psychiatrist's certification of defendant's incompetency. But see Morales v. State, 427
S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
3s427 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968), relied on the Townsend decision concerning incompetency proceedings. Morales clarifies a
point left dangling in the Townsend decision. The written motion asserting the defendant is of
"unsound mind" need not be supported by a doctor's affidavit. The reasoning is that since the issue
has been raised, it is the duty of the trial judge to inquire into the matter in the manner provided
in Townsend.
3OSee note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
"TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 34 (1958).
38See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
' According to Morales the hearing could take place after the reading of the indictment.
40427 S.W.2d at 61 n.;. The court observed that they were not deciding the question of
whether, if a preliminary hearing is had, insanity as a defense may be submitted as a second issue.
See TEx. CODE CRIM. Poc. ANN. art. 46.02, S 2(b) (3) (1965). Neither does the opinion pass
upon whether the defendant would be entitled to resubmission of the issue of incompetency at the
trial on the merits after losing a preliminary hearing before a different jury on that issue. Further,
the procedure does not specify conditions for securing medical observation and testimony on behalf
of the accused in the event the ssne has not been s--ured prior to the trial.
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mantic' and constitutional problems.' Major considerations left unresolved
are (1) the distinctions between incompetency and insanity, (2) whether
a jury is necessary to determine incompetency, (3) whether the same jury
should decide the separate issues of incompetency and insanity, and (4)
the practical application of any incompetency procedure. All of these
problems could and should be resolved in future revisions of the Penal
Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. '
III. ALTERNATE PROCEEDINGS To DETERMINE INCOMPETENCY
At least two methods for the administration of incompetency proce-
dures are available to future Texas code revisors. The first method reflects
the present trend away from jury involvement;" the second maintains
the role of the jury in determining incompetency. The first approach is to
adopt the provisions of the Model Penal Code." Where proper and timely
demand for a preliminary hearing on incompetency is made by a defend-
ant, the Model Code requires that the defendant be examined by at least
41Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968): "If such consent and
approval are not given, he is not entitled to such a preliminary hearing before a jury" and "the
trial judge is nevertheless under the duty . . . to forthwith afford the accused a hearing on his
competency to stand trial" appear contradictory. To construe these statements otherwise is to
expand and contract the meaning of a "preliminary hearing" as the situation warrants.
4 The optional consent of the prosecutor, provided in TEX. CoDE CRna. Pnoc. ANN. art. 46.02,
I 1 (1965), and approved by Townsend, may run afoul of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The prosecution may opt to allow bifurcation in the case of one man who
claims incompetency, and not in the case of another. The article sets out no classification criteria
to substantiate the option. The Constitution requires, in its concern for equality, that those who
are similarly situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classification is the
degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated. By exercising his option of con-
sent, the prosecutor thus "classifies" the defendant into one of two available slots. In one slot the
defendant, by virtue of the prosecutor's consent, is accorded a preliminary hearing before a jury
other than the jury determining guilt or innocence. In the other slot, by virtue of withheld consent,
the defendant presents his incompetency plea before the same jury hearing the trial on the merits.
The classification, then, rests upon the arbitrary exercise of option by the prosecutor, unsubstanti-
ated by any criteria, unreviewable by an appellate court, for reasons unknown to anyone other than
the prosecutor himself.
4' The new Code sought to abolish the preliminary trial on the issue of insanity. In
March 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson, held that as [a] matter of
constitutional right an accused is entitled to 'a special hearing' on the question of his
competence to stand trial when the question is raised.
The State Bar Committee is presently working on a re-draft of our insanity
statutes to meet the requirements of this case.
Morrison & Bowmer, Recommended Changes Code of Criminal Procedure, 29 TEx. B.J. 1003, 1056
(1966). "We are making clear distinctions between 'insanity,' which refers to a defendant's mental
state at the time of the offense, and 'competency,' which refers to the question of the defendant's
ability to stand trial, to be convicted, or to be sentenced. We have developed a separate test and
procedure for the determination of the competency issues." Penal Code Revision, 31 TEX. B.J. 622,
626 (1968) (report by Page Keeton). It has even been suggested that the entire process be com-
pletely revamped. See Cohen, Insanity and Incompetency, Federal and Texas, Usqsvuasrr, oF TEXAs
SCHOOL OF LAW, CRIMIsNAL PROCEDURE INsTrrUTE (paper No. 4, delivered Oct. 13-15, 1966).
4 While most jurisdictions do not require a jury determination of incompetency to stand trial,
the Townsend decision stated that "it would appear that Texas law would." 427 S.W.2d at 58.
This reasoning is based on TEX. CoNs-r. art. I, S 15, which provides that the right of a trial by
jury shall remain inviolate. But incompetency is determined at a "hearing" while insanity is litigated
at a "trial." Thus, an incompetency hearing could be determined without a jury and not run
contra to the Texas constitutional requirements. If the assertion is made that the incompetency
proceeding is a "trial," then the provisions of TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 34 (1958) become com-
plete nonsense.
45 MODEL PENAL CODE 5§ 4.01-.09 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955).
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one court-appointed psychiatrist." If either party contests the findings of
the psychiatrist, the psychiatrist who made the determination is summoned
and cross-examined, and further evidence of the issue may be offered be-
fore the court." This procedure avoids the multiplicity-of-juries prob-
lem while entitling all defendants to the same procedure. Also, the psy-
chiatrist, unhampered by the problem of communicating his findings
in terms meaningful to a jury, can give a technical diagnosis of the de-
fendant's condition.
The second method involves the combination of the Model Penal Code
and the requirement of a jury determination.4' By this method the defend-
ant, supported by a written motion asserting that he is of "unsound
mind," would have a right to a preliminary hearing on incompetency be-
fore a jury other than the convicting jury. The jury should be instructed
thoroughly on the test for incompetency, " and the hearing should be con-
fined solely to the incompetency issue.' No statement made by the accused
in the course of prior examinations or during the incompetency hearing
should be admitted as evidence on the issue of guilt in any later proceed-
ings." This second method would return Texas procedure to the path sug-
gested long ago in Ramirez v. State." Although the bifurcated trial tech-
nique may be costly and time-consuming,"3 it seems that cost and time
should not be determinative when defendant's constitutional rights are at
stake. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's decisions requiring that
indigents be provided counsel in criminal cases" and that trials with many
complex issues be bifurcated' do not give determinative weight to the
cost or time factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most of the problems of the Texas competency procedures stem from
deviation from the original purpose of such proceedings, which was to af-
ford the incompetent defendant protection from trial." The Penal Code
46Id. 5 4.05(1). Further, the court may direct that a qualified psychiatrist retained by the
defendant be permitted to witness and participate in the examination.
4 7d. 5 4.06(1). In this respect the Model Penal Code is an improvement of the federal statute
concerning incompetency, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964).
"The legislature clearly intended the jury determination of incompetency under TEx. CODE
Cram. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, S 2 (1965). However, it is questionable whether the legislators ever
considered a determination by the judge as being constitutional. See note 44 supra.
"The jury should likewise be instructed that a determination of incompetency results in defend-
ant's commitment, while a determination of competency results in the defendant proceeding to the
trial on the merits.
so Insanity is a complete defense under a plea of not guilty and is properly presented at the
trial on the merits. See note 16 supra. Any determination of insanity prior to the trial on the merits
is premature and improper. See note 19 supra.
" See Dalton, Pretrial Mental Examinations in Maine: Are They Mechanisms for Compelling
Self-Incrimination?, 18 ME. L. REV. 96 (1966). Dalton notes that problems of self-incrimination
arise when the accused makes statements of guilt during an examination, and concluded that the
California method of post-trial determination of insanity is better.
12 See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
"Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
1964 Wis. L. REV. 671, 681.
34Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Jackson v. Denno 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
"E.g., Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 466, art. 932a, at 1172; Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 486, art. 932b, at
143; and TEx. CODE CaIM. PiLoc. ANN. art. 46.02, §§ 1-2 (1965).
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and Code of Criminal Procedure Revision Committees have undertaken
the formidable task of developing precise distinctions between insanity
and incompetency for presentation to the 1971 Texas Legislature."' One
may expect to see (1) terminological changes that reflect the different
problems presented by mental unsoundness, (2) a mandatory preliminary
hearing on incompetency, (3) specific guidelines on jury involvement in
determining incompetency, and (4) the articulation of the various cri-
teria to be used in making each decision.
J. Christopher Bird
The Doctrine of Most Significant Contacts in Texas:
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.
In November 1964, an airplane owned by Mustang Aviation crashed in
Colorado, killing the four persons aboard. Three of the passengers were
Texas residents. All were employed by and on a business trip for a Texas
corporation. The aircraft was rented in Texas and had been hangared,
maintained, and licensed in Texas. The only contact the decedents had
with Colorado other than the accident was a one-hour stopover for refuel-
ing and weather information.1
Nevertheless, in the ensuing wrongful death action brought in Texas,
the defendant airline contended that the law of Colorado was applicable
since the accident occurred there and Texas traditionally followed the
rule of lex loci delicti.' The Colorado statute, however, allows a maximum
recovery of only $25,000 for wrongful death. To avoid this limitation
the plaintiffs argued that the lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in
favor of the emerging doctrine of "most significant contacts." Under the
"most significant contacts" rationale, the law of the jurisdiction with the
most significant relationship with the parties is applied. Thus the doc-
trine, if adopted, would make Texas law applicable to the case."
Refusing to follow plaintiff's suggestion, the trial court applied the Col-
orado limitation on recovery. The court of civil appeals, affirming the trial
court, refused to adopt the "most significant contacts doctrine," and held
that the substantive law of the place of the tort governed,' that the
amount of damages was substantive, and that Colorado limitation on re-
covery must therefore be applied. In reaching this decision, the court rea-
soned that article 4678,' giving Texas citizens the right to maintain an
action in Texas courts for wrongful death occurring in another state or
foreign country, made Colorado law applicable to determine the extent of
57 See note 43 sup,-a.
' Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 379 (1954). The lex loci delicti doctrine provides for
the application of the laws of the state where the injury occurred; J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON TE
CONFLICT OF LAW 1933-34 (1935).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1965), which ad-
vocates the application of the "local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties."
'TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-78 (1952). This would allow the plaintiffs to avoid
the Colorado limitation and have an unlimited recovery as provided by Texas Law.
' Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
OTEx. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
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